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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
YETZI~~N

H. DE~j[QOR,
Plaintiff' aud Respondent,

-YS.-

PAlTL Pi\ULUS and FOGG AND
BRADY FURNITURE CO~fp i\NY., a lT tah Corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF

o~F

Case
No. 9941

APPELLANT

ST.A.TEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action to recover for property damage sustained in the collision of two vehicles in Ogden City, Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court found for the plaintiff, awarding
damages for Yehic.Ie repairs and loss of use.
N~\.TURE

OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Defendant seeks reversal of the judg1nent entered
in the lower court.
1
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STATE~IENT

OF FACTS

This case involves a motor vehicle collision which
occurred on 1\tlay 19, 1961, at 2017 South Washington
Boulevard in Ogden, Utah. Defendant Paul Paulus 'vas
in the process of moving a large van-type truck, o\vned by
Defendant, Fogg and Brady Furniture Company, from a
parked position on the west curb line of Washington
Boulevard into a southerly course of travel on Washington Boulevard when a collision occurred involving the
left front bumper of defendant's vehicle and the right
side of plaintiff's vehicle. The weather was clear and
the pavement dry. The time was approximately 7:10p.m.
For illustrative purposes the following diagram
is submitted:

2
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The Defendant testified that he had "·aited for the
southbound traffic on Washington Boulevard to clear
and then had proceeded into Washington Boulevard at
an angle which was necessitated by vehicles being
parked to his front and to his rear. (R. 25) Defendant
further testified he did not see Plaintiff until Plaintiff
was approximately two car lengths away, at \vhich time
the Defendant immediately stopped his vehicle and the
collision occurred. (R. 25)
The damage to the Plaintiff's vehicle was described by Plaintiff (R-20) as being a "gash" along
the right side of his vehicle. The damage began at the
front of the right front door and continued along the
entire right side to the rear of Plaintiff's vehicle. The
only damage to Defendant's vehicle was a slightly bent
front bumper.
Plaintiff testified that he had been traveling east
on 20th Street and had made a right turn where 20th
Street intersects with Washington Boulevard. Plaintiff testified (R-16) that as he rounded the turn he
observed Defendant's truck moving away from the curb
at 2017 South Washington Boulevard. 2017 South Washington Boulevard is approximatley 150 feet South (R-8)
of the south curb line of 20th Street.
Plaintiff further testified (R-12) that as he observed
the Defendant's truck moving away from the curb he
moved his vehicle over next to the lane line which separates the inside and outside lane for southbound traffic.
Plaintiff testified (R-16) :
4
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'' ...\~ far as I \ra~ concerned that took rare of the

\\·holt• matter. 1 had given the truck enough room
to proceed and go 011 his \vay and then as I kept
on going I suddenly rcnlized that this just \vasn 't
going to \vork, I realized at the last second, this
truck, he kept on going at an angle to,vards the
lane in \vhich I ,,·as driving, ho,vever, for me it
,,.aR too late to stop."
Under cross-examination Plaintiff testified (R-18},
'~I had given the Defendant enough room and as far as
I thought ~lr. Paulus was going to go in making his angle
out and go on his 'vay south on Washington Boule Yard.',
Plaintiff testified that Defendant gave no indication
he was a"·are of Plaintiff's presence. Plaintiff did not
sound a \varning of his approach. ( R-18)

'• Q. Did ~[r. Paulus give you any indication that he
had seen you.
1\. He did not. There 'vas no turn signals, no

nothing.

Q. And did you sound your horn.
i\. I had no reason to.''

Plaintiff did not move to the inside lane. (R-19)
•'Q. .A.nd it 'vould have been possible for you to
have moved over into the inside lane and have
a voided this collision .
..:\. l . . es, sir, I could ha.v-e gone clear over to the
other side of the road too, but there was no reason for me to do that. I had taken every precaution to avoid the accident and I didn't even
expect an accident because I had given him all
the room he had needed.''

5
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Plaintiff then continued on and a collision occurred
at a point approximately 20 feet East of the west curb
line of Washington Boulevard. (R-6)
Defendant testified that his vehicle was stopped at
the moment of the impact (R-23). Plaintiff testified that
both vehicles were moving at the time of the rollision
and that the impact made both vehicles stop. (R-20)
However, Plaintiff testified in answer to the next question that his vehicle traveled approximately a car length
after the impact.

"Q. Mr. Paulus had actually come to a stop hy the
time you collided with him, had he not~
A. Well, he was going very slowly. I think the impact made both of us stop.
Q. How far did your car continue to travel after

the first part of the

impact~

A. A car length I guess, I bounced off his
bumper.''
Plaintiff admitted (R-13) that he was traveling
about twenty-five miles per hour.
ARGU~IENT

POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND
THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS A 11:ATTER OF
LAW AND THAT SUCH CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE PROXIMATELY CAUSED OR
CONTRIBUTED TO THE COLLISION.
6
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rrhe rrrial Court held that the Defendant failed to
prove that Plaintiff \vas contributorily negligent. The
flpfpJulant submits that the evidence in the record, construed most favorably to the Plaintiff, discloses condurt hy the Plaintiff that is clearly below the standard
of rare to \\·hirh Plaintiff is required to conform for his
O\Vn proteetion.
The Defendant further submits that
rca~onable minds could not differ thereon, that Plaintiff
did not aet as a reasonable man of ordinary prudence
under like circumstances should have acted.
This appeal presents two basic questions. Did the
Plaintiff have a duty to avoid the collision? If Plaintiff
did have a duty to avoid the collision, did Plaintiff act
with due care to avoid the collision?
Plaintiff entered Washington Blvd., a four-lane
high,vay that traverses Ogden's business district, from a
street controlled by a traffic semaphore. Plaintiff testified that he saw Defendant's truck, a large van-type
truck, moving into the outer traffic lane from its parking
place at the curb, as he rounded the corner and began to
proceed south on Washington Blvd. (T-12)
Plaintiff testified that he moved from his position in
the curb to side portion of the outer lane toward the inner lane, because he had observed Defendant's truck
leaving the curb zone and proceeding into the outer lane
of traffic. (T-12) The direct or casual relationship between Plaintiff's observation of Defendant's truck and
Plaintiff's immediate movement from the curb side
('vest) of the outer lane to the inner extremes of the
7
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outer lane is testified to by the Plaintiff on both di rPd
examination (T-12) and cross-examination (T-16). The
outer south-bound lane of the four-lane highv{a:· \ras
t\venty-four feet four inches, and the inner south-bonlld
lane \Vas ten feet eight inches (T-10). Despite Plaintiff'~
original shift in position \\Tithin the outer lanr, \rhi('ll
clearly seems to have been a reaction to the entrance of
Defendant's truck into that lane, Plaintiff did not moYr
into the inside lane, though he could have done so '':ithout endangering himself or others, since a red light had
stopped the flow of traffic along Washington Blvd. at that
time.
Defendant is willing to concede that, as a general
proposition or rule of la,v, a driver has a right to assume
that another driver \vill obey the la\Y and act \Yith due
care. (See 38 Am. Jur. NEGLIGENCE, Sec. 192, p. 871).
However, courts have placed a very significant limitation
on this rule. This limitation denies a driver the right to
assume due care by others when such driver has, or ought
to have, knowledge of circumstances indicating that thr
other motorist is not exercising due care for his own and
others' safety. (See 38 A1n. Jur. NEGLIGEXCE, Sec.
192, p. 871.) This rule of la,,~, with its limitation, has
been recognized by this court in numerous decisions
(See: Martin v. Sterens, 121 Utah 484, 243 P. 2d 747 ~
Bullock t~. Luke, 98 lTtah 501, 98 P. 2d 350; Lawder Y.
Hallen, 120 Utah 231, 233 P. 2d 350; and Bates Y.
Burns, 3 Utah 2d 180, 281 P. 2d 209.)
In Conklin v. 1Valsh, 113 Utah 276, 193 P. 2d 437,
this Court held that a "favored" driver's right to as8
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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~ume

thnt other drivers 'vill exercise due care does not
substitute for the "favored'' driYer 's duty to maintain
a propPr lookout.

In Utah, after Conklin, a driYer's right to assume
due rare on the part of others terminates when an alert
dri,·Pr 'vould have recognized the danger.
This court has indicated at various times that it
,vill charge a driver with knowledge of a danger that he
would have seen if he had exercised due care in ob~Pr\·ing the driving situation. (See: Martin v. Stevens,
supra; and Bates Y. Burns, supra.)
When a driver has actual or constructive knowlPdg-t\ of circumstances reasonably indicating that another driver is not acting with due care, then the assumption that others 'vill exercise due care terminates
and the alerted driver has the duty to act reasonably
under the circumstances to avoid a collision.
It would seem reasonable to conclude that Plaintiff, based on his reaction to the appearance of Defendant ·s truck on the highway, was alerted to the danger
po~E.'d by the truck. Plaintiff's own admissions would
justify this conclusion {T-12) (T-16).
Once ''alerted'' to the conduct of the Defendant
and of potential danger from such conduct, the Plaintiff cannot argue that he is entitled to the position of
an unaware motorist. Rather, with a realization of the
danger created by Defendant's angular entry, Plaintiff is compelled to act 'vith due care to avoid a collision.
9
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Plaintiff had many alternative courses of action
available to him that would have avoided the colli~io11.
He could have stopped entirely. He could have reduced
his speed until he determined where Defendant's vehicle
was going to turn from its angular course to the south.
He could have alone, or in combination \vith other acb-;,
sounded his horn. Or he could have used the unoccupied inner lane and avoided the truck. It would be
difficult to maintain the position, that the failure of
Plaintiff to adopt one of these possible course~ of
action '''"as not negligence.
In lieu of adopting one of the many reasonable
courses of action available to him, Plaintiff chose to
calculate what portion of the outer lane of the high"ray he thought the Defendant would need to turn his
large van-type truck from its parked position onto
Washington Blvd. Based on these mental calculations,
Plaintiff gave a few feet of high\vay and continued on at
a fairly rapid rate, astraddle the lane line, to,vard the
existing hazard.
Plaintiff testified that he gave Defendant the room
that \Vas necessary and considered the rna tter closed
(T-12); (T-18).

The absurdity of Plaintiff's conduct is most apparent \vhen one realizes that, at best, Plaintiff \vould come
,vithin inches of a collision. Any visual error could make
the difference.

10
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Plaintiff's conduct is in utter disregard of a very
basic demand of the law - that a Plaintiff, aware of an
approaching danger, must select a course of conduct reasonably calculated to reduce the risk.
ThP unoccupied lane, open to Plaintiff on the left,
eoupled "·i th the very slow speed of the Defendant's
trurk, suggest that Plaintiff's decision to remain in the
immedintely threatened lane of traffic is so below the
standard of care, required by the law, and the solution is
so devoid of possible benefits to be derived from this solution, that such conduct must be considered negligence
ns a matter of la.\v.

In Farrell v. Cameron, 98 Utah 69, 94 P. 2d 1068,
this Court held that a driver, who was alerted to the
other motorist's peril in an approaching car, slightly
o\·er the center line, was negligent as a matter of law for
failing to turn slightly and thereby avoid a collision. If
it is negligence to refuse to avoid a vehicle that intrudes
onto the wrong side of the highway, it would surely be
negligence where, as here, a driver elects to remain on
a collision course, w·hen an adjacent, safe lane is available.

This Court has also held that parties cannot insist on
right of way as an absolute (Bullock v. Luke, 98 Utah 501, \
98 P. 2d 350) or on a position or course of travel as an
absolute. (Farrell Y. Cameron, supra).
To allow an alerted motorist the right to continue a
course of travel that forseeably may intersect the course
traveled by a Defendant 'vho is unaware of the Plaintiff's
11
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presence, would be to allow gambling in lives, and encourage tests of skill in shaving danger.
Defendant further submits that Plaintiff violatPd
the provision of Section 41-6-35, U.C.A. 1953 and is therefore guilty of negligence as a matter of la,Y, in that observing a vehicle occupying the outside lane, even thong'h
at an angle, Plaintiff would be required to pass on the

left a.t a safe distance.
Defendant further submits that Plaintiff should be
held to be guilty of ~egligence as a matter of la\Y in that
he failed to sound his horn. Section 41-6-146, U.C.A.
1953 requires the sounding of a horn in those situatioll:--i
"\vhere it is ''reasonably necessary to insure safe operation.'' The case at hand would seem to be the very typP
of fact situation \Yhich the framers of the Statute had in
mind. If the Plaintiff had sounded his horn when he \Yas
first alerted to the danger, there is a good possibility that
the collision would have been avoided. The use of the
horn in a situation such as presented here would seem to
be even more imperative \Yhere a driver rather than
going around the danger goes, instead, to its very· edge.
In determining the issues presented by this AppeaL
it should be noted that the Court in the past has clearly
differentiated hct\Yeen t\YO types of traffic situations.
The first is "\Vhere the Plaintiff faces a complex situation involving several vehicles "'"hich require the Plaintiff to divide his attention between these several Yehicles.

The Court has referred to this as "multiple

12
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nppraist•nleut. '' ThP second traffic situation is the noncomplPx or simph~ situation \Yht•rc the Plaintiff is cont'rouh•d \rith a single Yehicle and his attention can be
fo('ust•d almost e:xelusi Yely on such vehicle. (See C' or·in.qfou , .. (--.o rpenfer, -t. Utah ~d 378, 294 P. 2d 788; and
Smith ,.. Ban.netf, 1 Utah 2d 224, 265 P. 2d 407.)
This classification has been used by the Court not
mcrl'ly as a. device to characterize a particular circumstanee, but also as a basis for deciding whether a. drivl'r's conduct amounted to negligence as a matter of la''?·
lTndoubtedly this classification was not intended to apply
n mechanical rule to all cases that fit the description of
either category.
The Court's theory appears to be based on the notion
that gi,·en a complex choice it would usually be left to
the trier of fact to determine whether the alternative
chosen \vas rea.sona ble and will seldom be considered a
math'r of law. On the other hand, given a driYer confronted "·ith only one vehicle, the conduct of such a driver
,·cry often, though not always, lk'nds itself to judicial determination as a matter of la"\
This appeal presents a case w·hich is a very uncomplieated traffic situation. The hazard is readily apparent, a
~lo\v-moving truck 'vith a driver apparently heedless to
Plaintiff's presence. The alternatiYes on the part of the
oncoming driYer are simple.
This case is strikingly similar in the basic traffic situation as that in the Co ~·ington Case "There the distinc-
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